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In this paper, I examine changes in the distribution of labor income across regions of Mexico during
the country's decade of globalization in the 1990's. I focus the analysis on men born in states with
either high-exposure or low-exposure to globalization, as measured by the share of foreign direct
investment, imports, or export assembly in state GDP. Controlling for regional differences in the
distribution  of  observable  characteristics  and  for  initial  differences  in  regional  incomes,  the
distribution of labor income in high-exposure states shifted to the right relative to the distribution
of income in low-exposure states. This change was primarily the result of a shift in mass in the
income distribution for low-exposure states from upper-middle income earners to lower income
earners. Labor income in low-exposure states fell relative to high-exposure states by 10% and the
incidence of wage poverty (the fraction of wage earners whose labor income would not sustain a
family of four at above-poverty consumption levels) in low-exposure states increased relative to
high-exposure states by 7%.
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1.  Introduction 
  There is now an immense body of literature on how globalization affects labor 
markets.    Early  research  centered  on  the  United  States  (Freeman,  1995;  Richardson, 
1995), motivated in part by an interest in understanding what caused marked changes in 
the  U.S.  wage  structure  during  the  1980’s  and  1990’s  (Katz  and  Autor,  1999).    A 
common  theme  in  this  work  is  that  globalization  –  especially  in  the  form  of  global 
outsourcing – has modestly but significantly contributed to increases in wage differentials 
between more and less-skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999 and 2003).  A small 
effect for international trade is perhaps not surprising, given the large size of the U.S. 
economy and the still limited role that trade plays in U.S. production and consumption 
(Feenstra, 1998; Freeman, 2003).  Later research shifted attention to other countries, and 
to the developing world in particular, which in the 1980’s began to lower barriers to trade 
and  capital  flows  aggressively.    The  tendency  for  rising  wage  inequality  to  follow 
globalization is not limited to the United States or other rich countries.  Expanding trade 
and capital flows have been associated with increases in the relative demand for skilled 
labor  in  many  economies,  including  Chile  (Pavcnik,  2003),  Columbia  (Attanasio, 
Goldberg, and Pavcnik, 2004), Hong Kong (Hsieh, 2003), Mexico (Feenstra and Hanson, 
1997), and Morocco (Currie and Harrison, 1997), just to list a few recent examples.
1 
  In  most  research  to  date,  the  focus  has  been  on  the  relationship  between 
globalization and earnings inequality.  Fewer studies have examined how globalization 
affects income levels.  This comes as something of a surprise, given the long-standing 
interest of developing-country research in how changes in policy affect the well-being of 
                                                 
1  See  Winters,  McCulloch,  and  McKay  (2004)  and  Pavcnik  and  Goldberg  (2004)  for  surveys  of  the 
literature on globalization and income in developing countries.   2 
the poor.  The relative lack of attention on the impact of globalization on poverty is 
perhaps partly attributable to methodology.  The most established empirical techniques 
for identifying the effects of economic shocks, such as globalization or technological 
change,  on  earnings  relate  to  estimating  changes  in  the  relative  demand  for  labor  of 
different skill types (Katz and Autor, 1999).  The lack of attention may also reflect a 
U.S.-bias in the type of questions being asked.  The strong emphasis in U.S. research on 
why  earnings  inequality  has  increased  may  have  spilled  over  into  research  on  other 
countries, partially crowding out other issues. 
  In this paper, I examine how the distribution of income changed in Mexico during 
country’s decade of globalization in the 1990’s.  Taking the income distribution as the 
unit of analysis makes it possible to examine changes both in the nature of inequality – 
reflected in the shape of the distribution – and in the level of income – reflected in the 
position of the distribution.  Mexico is an interesting  case because over the last two 
decades the country has aggressively opened its economy to the rest of the world.  This 
process  began  with  a  unilateral  liberalization  of  trade  in  1985,  continued  with  the 
elimination  of  many  restrictions  on  foreign  capital  in  1989,  and  culminated  with  the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (Hanson, 2004).
2 
  The one study of which I’m aware that attempts to estimate the impact of trade 
liberalization on poverty in Mexico is Nicita (2004).  He applies data from the Mexico’s 
National  Survey  of  Household  Income  and  Expenditure  to  techniques  developed  by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to construct an estimate of how tariff reductions have 
                                                 
2 See Chiquiar (2003) for a discussion of recent policy changes in Mexico.  For other work on the labor-
market implications of globalization in Mexico, see Ariola and Juhn (2003), Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), 
Farris (2003), Feliciano (2001), Revenga (1997), Hanson and Harrison (1999), and Robertson (2003).  See 
Hanson (2004) for a review of this literature.  For work on trade reform and wage inequality in Latin 
America, see Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely (2003).    3 
affected  household  welfare.    This  exercise  involves  estimating  the  impact  of  tariff 
changes on domestic goods’ prices, the impact of changes in goods’ prices on the wages 
of different skill groups, and income and price elasticities of demand for different goods, 
and then combining these estimates to form an estimate of the change in real income due 
to tariffs.  During the 1990’s, tariff changes appeared to raise disposable income for all 
households,  with  richer  households  enjoying  a  6%  increase  and  poorer  households 
enjoying a 2% increase.  These income gains imply a 3% reduction in the number of 
households in poverty.  Income gains are larger in regions closer to the United States, 
where tariff-induced price changes are larger.  I will also find that proximity to world 
markets matters for income changes.  By focusing on prices for final goods, the Deaton 
and  Muellbauer  (1980)  approach  taken  by  Nicita  (2004)  ignores  other  impacts  of 
globalization, such as increases in foreign investment or increased trade in intermediate 
inputs.  The approach I develop, which cannot relate specific policy changes to changes 
in income, does consider these other aspects of Mexico’s economic opening. 
  An  obvious  empirical  challenge  in  studying  income  distributions,  rather  than 
individuals or industries, is the paucity of degrees of freedom.  Income distributions are 
aggregate entities, implying the number of observations is limited to the number of time 
periods in the sample.  In my case, I really have only two observations, 1990 and 2000, 
corresponding  to  the  most  recent  years  in  which  Mexico  conducted  its  census  of 
population  and  housing.    My  strategy  for  identifying  the  impact  of  globalization  on 
Mexico’s income distribution is to exploit regional variation in exposure to foreign trade 
and investment.  As discussed in section 2, geography and history have made states in 
Mexico’s north and center highly exposed to globalization and left states in Mexico’s   4 
south relatively disengaged from the global economy.  I take states with high exposure to 
globalization to be the treatment group and states with low exposure to globalization to 
be the control group (leaving states with intermediate exposure to globalization out of the 
analysis).  I then apply a difference-in-difference strategy by comparing the change in the 
income distribution for high-exposure states to the change in income distribution for low-
exposure states during  Mexico’s globalization decade.   Implicit in the analysis is the 
assumption is that labor is sufficiently immobile across regions of Mexico for region-
specific labor-demand shocks to affect regional differentials in labor income. 
  The analysis is complicated by a host of issues, three of which stand out.  One is 
that  income  distributions  change  both  because  the  characteristics  of  the  underlying 
population of individuals change and because the returns to these characteristics change.  
To  identify  the  effects  of  globalization,  I  want  to  examine  changes  in  returns  to 
characteristics (in my case, inter-regional differences in these changes), while holding the 
distribution of characteristics constant.  To perform this exercise, I apply non-parametric 
techniques from DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, and 
McCrary (2004), which I describe in section 3.  I also compare results from this approach 
to  results  from  a  more-standard  parametric  approach,  both  of  which  are  presented  in 
section  4.    A  second  issue  is  that  other  shocks  in  the  1990’s  may  also  have  had 
differential effects on regions with high versus low exposure to globalization.  Candidate 
shocks include the privation and deregulation of industry, the reform of Mexico’s land-
tenure system, and, most importantly, Mexico’s peso crisis in 1994.  The potential for 
these shocks to contaminate the analysis is an important concern, which I address by way 
of discussing qualifications to my results in section 5.     5 
  A  third  issue  has  to  do  with  measurement.    There  are  many  components  to 
income, including labor earnings, capital returns, rental income, government transfers, 
gifts, and remittances from family members abroad.  Surveys that measure each of these 
components  carefully,  such  as  Mexico’s  National  Survey  of  Household  Income  and 
Expenditure, are not representative across the regions of the country (Cortes et al., 2003), 
which makes it impossible to apply my estimation strategy to these data.  Surveys that are 
representative across Mexico’s regions, such as the Census of Population and Housing, 
measure labor income with relatively high precision, but lack complete data on other 
income categories.  To ensure my data are regionally representative, I use the Mexican 
Census, and to minimize the impact of measurement error, I focus the analysis on labor 
income.  Excluding other sources of income has the obvious drawback of limiting the 
analysis to labor earnings, rather than to the full distribution of income.
3 
  To  preview  the  results,  states  with  high-exposure  to  globalization  began  the 
1990’s with higher incomes than low exposure states, even after controlling for regional 
differences  in  the  observable  characteristics  of  individuals.    During  the  1990’s,  low-
exposure states had slower growth in labor income than high-exposure states.  This took 
the form of a left-ward shift in the income distribution of low-exposure states relative to 
high-exposure states.   The results of this income shift were (a) a decrease in average 
labor earnings of 10% for individuals from states with low exposure to globalization 
relative to individuals from states with high exposure to globalization, and (b) an increase 
in the incidence of wage poverty (the fraction of wage earners whose labor income would 
                                                 
3 One interesting extension to my analysis would be to use Mexico’s National Survey of Household Income 
and Expenditure to estimate the empirical relationship between labor income and poverty.  One could then 
use this mapping to evaluate how the changes in labor income that I estimate (using data from the Census 
of Population and Housing) may have affected poverty.   6 
not sustain a family of four at above-poverty consumption levels) in low-exposure states 
of 7% relative to that in high-exposure states. 
 
2.  Regional Exposure to Globalization 
2.1  Data Sources 
  Data for the analysis come from two sources.  In 1990, I use the 1% microsample 
of  the  XII  Censo  General  de  Poblacion  y  Vivienda,  1990,  and  in  2000  I  use  a  10% 
random  sample  of  the  10%  microsample  of  the  XIII  Censo  General  de  Poblacion  y 
Vivienda, 2000.  The sample is working age men with positive labor earnings.  I focus on 
men, since labor-force participation rates for women are low and vary considerably over 
time, ranging from 21% in 1990 to 32% in 2000.  This creates issues of sample selection 
associated with who supplies labor outside the home.  Compounding the problem, many 
women who report zero labor earnings may work in the family business or on the family 
farm.    For  men,  problems  of  sample  selection  and  measurement  error  also  exist  but 
appear to be less severe.  Their labor-force participation rates vary less over time, rising 
modestly from 73% in 1990 to 74% in 2000.  Still, differences in labor-force participation 
over time and across regions could affect the results reported in section 4.  In section 3, I 
discuss strategies to correct for self-selection into the labor force. 
 
2.2  The Opening of Mexico’s Economy 
  In Mexico, the last two decades have not been a quiet period.  Since 1980, the 
country  has  had  three  currency  crises,  bouts  of  high  inflation,  and  several  severe 
macroeconomic  contractions,  the  most  recent  of  which  occurred  in  1995  following  a 
large devaluation of the peso that precipitated the country’s conversion from a fixed to a   7 
floating exchange rate.  The liberalization of the country’s trade and investment policies 
has  been,  in  part,  a  response  to  this  turmoil.    Mexico’s  currency  crises  and  ensuing 
contractions have had very negative consequences on the country’s poor.  Table 1 shows 
that poverty rates rose sharply after the 1995 peso crisis. 
  Mexico’s economic opening began in 1982, when the government responded to a 
severe balance of payments crisis by easing restrictions on export assembly plants known 
as maquiladoras.  In 1985, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), which entailed cutting tariffs and eliminating many non-tariff barriers.  In 1989, 
Mexico eased restrictions on the rights of foreigners to own assets in the country.  In 
1994, NAFTA consolidated and extended these reforms.  Partly as a result of these policy 
changes, the share of international trade in Mexico’s GDP has nearly tripled, rising from 
11% in 1980 to 32% in 2002.  Mexico is now as closely tied to the U.S. economy as it 
has been at any point in its history.  In 2002, the country sent 89% of its exports to and 
bought 73% of its imports from the United States.
4 
  Mexico’s  maquiladoras,  shown  in  Figure  1,  have  been  instrumental  in  the 
country’s export conversion.  Between 1983 and 2002, real value added in maquiladoras 
grew at an average annual rate of 11%, making it the most dynamic sector in the country.  
In 2002, these export assembly plants accounted for 45% of Mexico’s manufacturing 
exports and 28% of the country’s manufacturing employment (up from 4% in 1980).  
Their  concentration  in  northern  Mexico  in  part  accounts  for  the  differential  regional 
impact of globalization in the country.  A brief history of Mexico’s trade policy reveals 
the origins of northern Mexico’s advantage in export production. 
                                                 
4 Concomitant with its economic opening, Mexico privatized state-owned enterprises, deregulated entry 
restrictions in many industries, and used wage and price restraints to combat inflation.   8 
  In the 1940’s, Mexico adopted a strategy of import substitution industrialization.  
To  import  most  manufacturing  products,  firms  had  to  obtain  a  license  from  the 
government and to pay moderate to high tariffs.  In 1965, Mexico softened its import 
substitution strategy by allowing the creation of maquiladoras (Hansen, 1981).
5  Firms 
could import free of duty the inputs, machinery, and parts needed for export assembly 
operations, as long as they exported all output.  To ensure firms abided by this rule, they 
were required to buy a bond equal to the value of their imports that would be returned to 
them once they had exported all their imported inputs in the form of final goods (hence 
the term in-bond assembly plants).  In contrast to other firms in the country, maquiladoras 
could be 100% foreign owned.  Bureaucratic restrictions on maquiladoras kept the sector 
small until 1982, when the government streamlined regulation of the plants. 
  Initially, maquiladoras were required to locate within 20 miles of an international 
border  or  coastline.    In  1972,  the  government  relaxed  these  rules  and  allowed 
maquiladoras  to  locate  throughout  the  country.    However,  the  plants  continued  to 
concentrate  near  the  United  States.    As  seen  in  Figure  2,  83%  of  maquiladora 
employment is still located in states on the U.S. border.  Proximity to the U.S. market is 
motivated in part by a desire to be near U.S. consumers, to whom maquiladoras export 
most of their production, and in part by a desire to be near U.S. firms, who often manage 
Mexican maquiladoras out of offices based in U.S. border cities. 
  U.S. trade policies initially gave maquiladoras an advantage over other Mexican 
producers  in  exporting  to  the  U.S.  market.    Prior  to  NAFTA,  a  U.S.  firm  that  made 
                                                 
5 The original motivation for this program was to create employment opportunities for Mexican workers 
returning to the country after working in the United States as temporary farm laborers under the Bracero 
Program.  The U.S. government ended the Bracero Program in 1964 and the Mexican government was 
concerned that the returning workers would raise unemployment in border states.   9 
components, shipped them to a plant in Mexico for assembly, and then reimported the 
finished good only paid U.S. import duties on the value of Mexican labor and raw materials 
used in assembly.  NAFTA ended this special status for maquiladoras by giving all Mexican 
firms duty free access to the U.S. market.
6  Yet, as seen in Figure 1, NAFTA did little to 
stunt the growth of maquiladoras.  In a purely legalistic sense, NAFTA did mean the end of 
the maquiladora regime; it eliminated the "in-bond" arrangement under which maquiladoras 
operated.    However,  Mexico' s  low  wages  continue  to  give  the  country  a  comparative 
advantage in the assembly of manufactured goods for the U.S. economy. 
 
2.3  Regional Exposure to Globalization 
  Mexico’s trade and investment reforms have dramatically increased the openness 
of its economy.  These policies appear to have affected some parts of the country much 
more than others.  Figure 3 plots the share of state GDP accounted for by valued added in 
maquiladoras during the 1990’s against distance to the United States.  For three of the six 
states  that  border  the  United  States  (Baja  California,  Chihuahua,  Tamaulipas),  the 
maquiladora share of GDP is over 18%.  For two of the three others (Coahuila, Sonora) it 
is over 8%.  In the rest of the country, the maquiladora share of GDP is below 5%. 
  While maquiladoras are a large part of Mexico’s exports, they are by no means 
the whole story.  Export production also occurs in states with relatively large supplies of 
skilled labor, which have attracted multinational auto companies (as in Aguascalientes) 
and  electronics  producers  (as  in  Jalisco).    Figure  4  plots  the  share  of  foreign  direct 
investment in state GDP against the share of maquiladora value added in state GDP, both 
                                                 
6 With NAFTA, all firms in Mexico obtained duty-free access to the U.S. market as long as they comply 
with NAFTA rules of origin.  NAFTA also exposes maquiladoras to rules of origin (from which they had 
been exempt previously), but now also allows the plants to sell goods on the Mexican market.   10 
averaged over the 1990’s.  While border states show up as high in both categories, other 
states have attracted foreign direct investment in forms besides maquiladoras.  These 
include states in which Mexico’s most important industrial cities are located (Mexico 
City, Federal District; Monterrey, Nuevo Leon; Guadalajara, Jalisco). 
  Beyond FDI and maquiladoras, some states are exposed to globalization by virtue 
of having ports and being large importers.  This is seen in Figure 5, which plots FDI as a 
share of state GDP against imports as a share of state GDP.
7  A few states, such as 
Yucatan and Sinaloa, have high imports, while attracting little in the way of FDI. 
  To categorize states as having high or low exposure to globalization, I use the 
three measures described in Figures 3-5:  the share of maquiladora value added in state 
GDP,  the  share  of  FDI  in  state  GDP,  and  the  share  of  imports  in  state  GDP  (each 
averaged over the period 1993-1999).  Using all three measures is important, since with 
the exception of FDI and imports they are relatively weakly correlated across states, as 
reported in Table 2.  Table 3 reports the globalization measures for Mexico’s 32 states, 
where states are sorted according to their average rank across the three measures.  I select 
as states with high exposure to globalization those whose average rank across the three 
measures is in the top third (and that have at least one individual rank in the top third) and 
I select as states with low exposure to globalization those whose average rank is in the 
bottom third (and that have no single rank in the top third). 
  Of the 7 states with high-exposure to globalization, 5 share a border with the 
United  States;  of  the  10  states  with  low-exposure  to  globalization,  5  are  in  southern 
Mexico.  Historically, Mexico’s north – with its more abundant mineral deposits, lower 
population densities, and closer proximity to the United States – has been relatively rich, 
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while  Mexico’s  south  –  with  its  higher  population  densities  and  larger  indigenous 
community – has been relatively poor.  It is well known that since Mexico’s economic 
opening the border region has enjoyed relatively high wage growth, widening regional 
wage differentials in the country (Hanson, 2004).  However, the recent success of the 
border  follows  a  period  in  which  Mexico’s  poorer  regions  had  been  catching  up.  
Chiquiar (2004) finds that from 1970 to 1985, the 15 years preceding Mexico’s entry into 
the GATT, there was convergence in per capita GDP levels across Mexican states, and 
that  after  1985  this  process  broke  down.    For  the  period  1985-2001,  there  is  strong 
divergence  in  state  per  capita  GDP  levels.    His  results  are  reproduced  in  Figure  6.  
Mexico’s globalization decade thus follows a period during which income differences 
between high-exposure states and low-exposure states had been closing. 
  Finally, it is important to note that exposure to globalization is not simply a proxy 
for the opportunity to migrate to the United States.  Contrary to popular belief, migration 
to the United States is not especially common among residents of Mexican states on the 
U.S. border.  Mexico’s high migration states are in agricultural regions in central and 
western Mexico, which have dominated migration to the United States for most of the 
last  century  (Durand,  Massey,  and  Zenteno,  2001).    Most  of  these  states  have  low 
exposure to FDI or to trade, as seen in Figures 7 and 8, which plot the fraction of the state 
population migrating to the United States over the period 1995-2000 against the share of 
FDI in state GDP or the share of imports in state GDP.  This suggests that high exposure 
to globalization does not indicate high exposure to emigration. 
  Proximity to the United States explains part of regional differences in exposure to 
globalization,  but  it  is  clearly  not  the  whole  story.    Other  states  have  become  more   12 
integrated  into  the  global  economy  by  virtue  of  having  more  skilled  workers,  better 
transportation  infrastructure,  or  larger  markets.    These  features,  while  present  before 
globalization took hold in Mexico, are not exogenous.  They reflect the ability of these 
states to develop economically, which may in turn reflect the quality of their legal or 
political  institutions  or  other  historical  factors.    This  suggests  that  my  measure  of 
exposure  to  globalization  may  proxy  for  institutional  quality  or  other  regional 
characteristics.  Identifying the factors that determine regional variation in exposure to 
global markets, while beyond the scope if this paper, is important.  Without this mapping, 
one cannot make policy recommendations.  My findings  will suggest that in Mexico 
regions more exposed to globalization have done better in terms of income growth.  But 
the policy implications of this result are unclear as I leave unanswered the question of 
how one goes about increasing regional exposure. 
 
3.  Empirical Methodology 
  The empirical analysis involves comparing changes in income distribution during 
Mexico’s globalization decade between two groups of states, states with high exposure to 
globalization and states with low exposure to globalization.  In this section, I describe 
non-parametric and parametric approaches for making these comparisons. 
 
3.1  Estimating Counterfactual Income Densities 
Let f(w|x,i,t) be the density of labor income, w, conditional on a set of observed 
characteristics,  x,  in  region  i  and  time  t.    Define  h(x|i,t)  as  the  density  of  observed 
characteristics among income earners in region i and time t.  For regions, i=H indicates 
high exposure to globalization and i=L indicates low exposure to globalization; for time   13 
periods, t=00 indicates the year 2000 and t=90 indicates the year 1990.  The observed 
density of labor income for individuals in i at t is, 
      ￿ = dx ) t , i | x ( h ) t , i , x | w ( f ) t , i | w ( g      (1) 
Differences  in  ) t , H , x | w ( f   and  ) t , L , x | w ( f   capture  differences  in  returns  to 
observable  characteristics  in  regions  with  high  versus  low  exposure  to  globalization; 
differences in h(x|H,t) and h(x|L,t) capture differences in the distribution of observed 
characteristics in high versus low-exposure regions. 
  To evaluate the change in income distributions across time and across regions, I 
would like to compare changes in  ) t , H , x | w ( f  and  ) t , L , x | w ( f , while holding the 
distribution  of  x  constant.    However,  in  the  data  I  do  observe  not  these  conditional 
densities, but the only marginal densities, g(w|x,H,t) and g(w|x,L,t).  To evaluate these 
densities, I apply techniques from DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).  First, consider 
the cross-time change in income distribution in the high-exposure region that is due to 
changes in returns to observable characteristics, which can be written as 
  ￿ ￿ - dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , H , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 00 , H , x | w ( f     (2)  
Equation  (2)  evaluates  the  change  in  income  distribution  in  high-exposure  regions 
between 1990 and 2000, fixing the marginal density of observables to be that in high-
exposure regions in 1990.  Rewrite equation (2) as  
      ￿ - ® dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , H , x | w ( f ] 1 [ 00 H 90 H q     (3)  
where 
       
) 90 , H , x | w ( f
) 00 , H , x | w ( f 00 H 90 H = ® q       (4)    14 
Equation (3) is simply the observed marginal income density in high-exposure regions in 
1990, adjusted by a weighting function.  Given an estimate of the weighting function in 
(4), it would be straightforward to apply a standard kernel density estimator to equation 
(3).  The key, then, to estimating the change in income distribution that is due to changes 
in returns to observables is estimating the weighting function in (4). 
    Before turning to the weighting functions, consider the analog to equation (2) for 
regions with low exposure to globalization.  The change in income distribution in low-
exposure regions that is due to changes in returns to observables is 
  ￿ ￿ - dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 00 , L , x | w ( f     (5)  
Equation (5) evaluates the change in income distribution in regions with low exposure to 
globalization between 1990 and 2000, again fixing the marginal density of observables to 
be  that  in  high-exposure  regions  in  1990.    To  rewrite  equation  (5)  in  terms  of  the 
marginal density of income in high-exposure regions in 1990, apply the weights  
 
) 90 , H , x | w ( f
) 90 , L , x | w ( f
and
) 90 , H , x | w ( f
) 00 , L , x | w ( f 90 L 90 H 00 L 90 H = = ® ® q q   (6) 
which yields 
    ￿
® ® - dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , H , x | w ( f ] [ 90 L 90 H 00 L 90 H q q    (7)  
As  in  estimating  equation  (3),  estimating  equation  (7)  comes  down  to  applying  the 
appropriate weighting function to a standard kernel density estimator. 
  The changes in conditional income densities in equations (2) and (5) reflect in 
part the impact of globalization and in part the impact of other aggregate shocks to the 
Mexican economy.  The difference between these changes amounts to a difference-in-
difference estimator, which evaluates the change in returns to observables in regions with   15 
high exposure to globalization relative to the change in returns observables in regions 




( ) ( ) ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
® ® ® - - -
= -
- -
dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , H , x | w ( f 1
dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , L , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 00 , L , x | w ( f
dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 90 , H , x | w ( f dx ) 90 , H | x ( h ) 00 , H , x | w ( f
90 L 90 H 00 L 90 H 00 H 90 H q q q
 
                      (8) 
Equation  (8)  shows  the  1990-to-2000  change  income  distribution  in  high-exposure 
regions relative to low-exposure regions, holding the distribution of observables constant.  
I  use  equation  (8)  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  globalization  on  income  distribution  in 
Mexico.  The choice of the high-exposure  region in 1990 as the base case is purely 
arbitrary and should not affect the density difference.  To check the robustness of the 
results, I will discuss estimates using other base cases. 
  To estimate the weighting functions in (4) and (6), I use Leibbrandt, Levinsohn, 
and McCrary’s (2004) extension of the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).  Applying 
Bayes’ Axiom to the weighting equations yields,  
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                      (9) 
Each weighting function is the product of odds ratios.  Consider the first weight.  The 
first ratio is the odds an individual is from a high-exposure region in 2000 (based on a   16 
sample  of  individuals  from  high-exposure  regions  in  1990  and  2000),  conditional  on 
observables, x, and labor income, w.  The second ratio is the (inverse) odds an individual 
is from a high-exposure region in 2000 (again, based on a sample of individuals from 
high-exposure regions in 1990 and 2000), conditional on just on x.  I can estimate the 
odds ratios by estimating two logit models.  In each case, the dependent variable is a 0-1 
variable on the outcome i=H and t=00 (based on a sample of i=H and t=90 or 00).  For 
the first logit model, the regressors are x and w; for the second, the regressor is x, alone.  
The other weights can be estimated analogously.   
  After estimating the weights, I apply them to a standard kernel density estimator 
to  obtain  estimates  for  the  densities  described  by  equations  (3),  (7),  and  (9).    These 
estimates are for the difference in income densities, in the case of (3) and (7), and for the 
double difference in income densities, in the case of equation (9). 
 
3.2  A Parametric Analog 
  The advantage of the approach described in section 3.1 is that it characterizes the 
difference in income across time periods and/or regions at all points in the distribution.  
The disadvantage is that there are no standard errors for these density differences.  To 
examine  the  statistical  significance  of  the  results,  I  estimate  a  parametric  analog  to 
equation (8), which is simply a difference-in-difference wage equation. 
  I pool data on working age men in 1990 and 2000 from states with either high 
exposure or low exposure to globalization and then estimate the following regression, 
hst hs ht hs 3 ht 2 1 hst s hst High * 2000 Y * ) High 2000 Y ( X w ln e f b b b a + + + + + =  
                      (10)   17 
where w is labor market earnings, X is a vector of observed characteristics, Y2000 is a 
dummy variable for the year 2000, and High is a dummy variable for high-exposure 
states.    The  regression  includes  controls  for  state  fixed  effects  and  allows  returns  to 
observable characteristics to vary across regions and across time.  The coefficient, ￿, 
captures the differential change in earnings from 1990 to 2000 between states with high-
exposure and low-exposure to globalization. 
  Equation (10) is a standard difference-in-difference specification, which implies I 
estimate the mean differential in wage growth between low-exposure and high-exposure 
states.  This approach ignores the possibility that the wage effect of being in a state with 
high exposure to globalization may not be uniform throughout the wage distribution.  The 
results presented in the next section will provide evidence consistent with this possibility.  
A more elegant approach would be to estimate the regional differential in wage changes 
non-parametrically, as in the framework derived by Athey and Imbens (2003). 
 
3.3  Estimation Issues 
  Several  estimation  issues  merit  attention.    First,  individuals  self-select  into 
regions.    Individuals  who  have  chosen  to  live  in  a  state  with  high-exposure  to 
globalization may have relatively high drive or ambition and may have moved to the state 
to take advantage of the opportunities globalization offers.  Similarly, individuals who 
have chosen not to leave states with low-exposure to globalization may have relatively 
low drive or ambition.  Given this pattern of selection, unobserved components of labor 
income would tend to be positive for individuals in high-exposure states and negative for 
individuals in low-exposure states.  The estimation exercises in (9) and (10) would then 
be polluted by systematic differences in unobserved characteristics between regions.  To   18 
avoid this problem, I categorize individuals by birth state and not by state of residence.  
In this way, I pick up earnings differences in where people live based on where they were 
born – a factor out of their control – and not on where they have chosen to reside – a 
factor in their control.  Consistent with expectations, in 1990 83% of those born in high-
exposure states still lived in those states, compared to only 73% of those born in low-
exposure states.  In 2000, the figures were 82% and 70%. 
  A second estimation issue is that individuals self-select into the labor force.  This 
is partly due to age.  Over time, young workers enter the labor force and older workers 
exit.  To control for these movements, I limit the sample to the cohort of men who were 
25 to 55 years old in 1990 (and 35 to 65 years old in 2000).  Relatedly, if over the 1990’s 
labor-market conditions improved by more in high-exposure states than in low-exposure 
states, high-exposure states may have registered a larger increase the fraction of low-
ability  individuals  participating  in  the  labor  force.    Given  this  pattern  of  selection, 
unobserved components of labor income may have increased by less in high-exposure 
states and than in low-exposure states.
8  To control for selection into the labor-force, I 
follow Lee (2004) and trim low-wage earners across the four samples (i.e., for i=H,L and 
t=90,00) such that the fraction included in the estimation is the same for each group. 
  A third estimation issue is that shocks other than globalization may have had 
differential impacts on regions with high versus low exposure to globalization.  One such 
shock is the pesos crisis of 1995.  After a bungled devaluation of the peso in 1994, 
Mexico chose to float its currency, which proceeded to plummet in value relative to the 
dollar.    The  ensuing  increase  in  the  peso  value  of  dollar-denominated  liabilities 
                                                 
8 This suggests that selection into the labor force would work against selection into regions, in terms of the 
impact on unobserved components of earnings.   19 
contributed to a banking collapse and a severe macroeconomic contraction.  It is hard to 
gauge whether the peso crisis would have hurt states with high exposure to globalization 
more or less than states with low exposure.  On the one hand, high-exposure states are 
more specialized in the production of exports and the devaluation of the peso would have 
increased demand for their output.  On the other hand, high-exposure states are better 
integrated into Mexico’s financial markets and the banking collapse may have hurt them 
more.  Other important shocks in the 1990’s included a reform of Mexico’s land tenure 
system in 1992, the ongoing privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation of 
industries, and the ruling party’s loss of majority control in Mexico’s congress in 1997.  
Again, it is hard to say whether these shocks would have helped or hurt high-exposure 
states more.  The existence of these other shocks leaves the results subject to the caveat 
that factors other than globalization may have accounted for any differential change in 
income distribution across regions of the country.  I return to this issue in section 5. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
  The sample for the analysis is men aged 25 to 55 in 1990 or 35 to 65 in 2000 who 
were born in one of the seven Mexican states with high-exposure to globalization or in 
one  of  the  ten  Mexican  states  with  low-exposure  to  globalization.    The  dependent 
variable is log average hourly labor earnings.
9  I also discuss results using log total labor 
income as the dependent variable.  Summary statistics are in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
9 For Mexico, average hourly wages are calculated as monthly labor income/(4.5*hours worked last week); for the 
U.S., average hourly wages are calculated as annual labor income/(weeks worked last year*usual hours worked per 
week).    Assuming  individuals  work  all  weeks  of  a  month  could  bias  wage  estimates  downwards.    To  avoid 
measurement error associated with implausibly low wage values or with top coding of earnings, I restrict the sample to 
be individuals with hourly wages between $0.05 and $20 (in 2000 dollars).  This restriction is nearly identical to 
dropping the largest and smallest 0.5% of wage values.   20 
4.1  Raw Income Distributions 
  To provide a starting point for the analysis, consider the raw distributions of labor 
income in states with either high exposure or low exposure to globalization.  Figure 9 
shows kernel density estimates for hourly labor earnings in 1990 and 2000.  In both 
years,  the  density  for  high-exposure  states  is  shifted  to  the  right  compared  to  low-
exposure states.  Between 1990 and 2000, the difference between the wage densities in 
the two groups of states appears to widen.  Higher wages in high-exposure states reflect 
in part the fact these states have a more highly educated labor force, as indicated by Table 
4.  Higher wages in high-exposure states may also reflect differences in the returns to 
observable characteristics across states in Mexico. 
To  see  what  these  distributional  differences  imply  about  differences  in  the 
incidence of poverty between regions, Figure 10 shows the cumulative distribution for 
wages in high-exposure and low-exposure states in the two years.  The vertical line in 
each graph shows the hourly wage needed to provide the minimum caloric intake for a 
family of four with one wage earner working the mean number of annual labor hours in 
that year.
10  The peso value for the minimum caloric intake is from Cortes et al. (2003).  
The poverty wage line in Figure 10 is not meant to provide an accurate indicator of the 
fraction of individuals living in poverty.  By focusing on labor income, I ignore other 
sources  of  household  earnings.    Government  transfers,  rental  income,  loans,  in-kind 
receipts,  and  remittances  also  supplement  family  income,  suggesting  that  the  implied 
poverty wage threshold in Figure 10 is set too high – some families below this threshold 
                                                 
10 In 1990, the implied poverty cutoff for the hourly wage was $1.16 in low-exposure regions and $1.25 in high-
exposure regions (in 2000 US dollars), and in 2000, it was $1.13 in low-exposure regions and $1.22 in high-exposure 
regions.  The poverty wage is lower in low-exposure regions because rural areas have lower prices for goods and 
because a higher fraction of the population in low-exposure regions lives in rural areas.  The line shown in Figure 9 is 
that for the log poverty wage in low-exposure regions (in log terms the poverty wage in high-exposure and low-
exposure regions is nearly the same).   21 
will receive enough income from other sources to allow them to afford a consumption 
level that is above the poverty cutoff.  Still, the poverty wage is a useful benchmark for 
gauging  the  potential  for  a  worker  to  sustain  a  family  at  above-poverty  consumption 
levels on labor income alone (which is two-thirds of total income in Mexico). 
In 1990, the fraction of workers earning less than the poverty cutoff wage in low-
exposure  regions  (0.42)  is  twice  that  in  high-exposure  regions  (0.21).    In  2000,  the 
difference is even larger, with the fraction of workers below the poverty wage at 0.49 in 
low-exposure regions and 0.22 in high-exposure regions.  While it appears that poverty 
increased more rapidly in low-exposure regions, the results in Figure 10 are inconclusive.  
Since both the price of labor and the composition of labor is changing across regions and 
over  time,  we  don’t  know  whether  the  apparent  increase  in  the  relative  incidence  of 
poverty in low-exposure regions is due to a deterioration in the returns to observable 
characteristics or to change in the relative composition of the labor force.  To separate 
these effects, I construct counterfactual income densities. 
 
4.2  Counterfactual Income Distributions 
To  control  for  regional  differences  in  the  distribution  of  observable 
characteristics, I apply the weights in equation (9) to the kernel density for high-exposure 
states in 1990.  This produces the two sets of densities in Figure 11.  The first graph 
shows the actual income density in 1990 for high-exposure states and a counterfactual 
density that would obtain were workers in high-exposure states in 1990 paid according to 
the returns to observable characteristics in low-exposure states in 1990, or   
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Since  the  distribution  of  observable  characteristics  is  the  same  in  the  actual  and 
counterfactual  densities,  comparing  the  two  makes  it  possible  to  isolate  the  regional 
differences in income densities that are attributable to regional differences in returns to 
characteristics.  In Figure 11, the density for high-exposure states in 1990 is again right-
shifted  relative  to  low-exposure  states,  though  the  regional  difference  in  incomes  is 
smaller than in Figure 9.  Thus, even before Mexico’s globalization decade, incomes 
were higher across the distribution in high-exposure states.  These income differences 
may be due to high-exposure states historically having better infrastructure, being more 
specialized in the high-wage manufacturing sector, or being less specialized in the low-
wage agricultural sector, among other factors (see Chiquiar, 2003, for a more complete 
discussion).  This highlights the importance of controlling for initial income differences 
between states when examining changes in income distributions over time. 
  The second graph in Figure 11 shows income densities in 2000, evaluated based 
on the distribution of observable characteristics in high-exposure states 1990.  For high-
exposure states, the resulting counterfactual density is what workers in high-exposure 
states in 2000 would earn were they to have the observable characteristics of workers in 
high-exposure states in 1990, or 
￿ ￿
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For low-exposure states, the counterfactual is what workers in low-exposure states in 
2000 would earn had they the characteristics of high-exposure states in 1990, or 
￿ ￿
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Comparing these counterfactuals isolates regional differences in income densities that are 
due  to  differences  in  returns  to  characteristics,  rather  than  to  the  distribution  of   23 
observables.  As in 1990, the density for high-exposure states in 2000 is right-shifted 
relative to low-exposure states.  Comparing the two years, it appears that differences in 
income densities between high-exposure and low-exposure states have  increased over 
time, suggesting relative incomes have risen in the former. 
  To  relate  the  counterfactual  wage  densities  to  poverty,  Figure  12  shows  the 
cumulative distribution analogues to the counterfactual wage kernels in Figure 11.  The 
first graph in Figure 12 thus shows the cumulative density for wages in high-exposure 
and low-exposure states in 1990, based on the characteristics of workers in high-exposure 
regions in 1990.  Comparing this graph to the first graph in Figure 10, we again see that 
the fraction of workers below the poverty wage is higher in low-exposure states (0.32) 
than in high-exposure states (0.21).  However, the difference in the incidence of wage 
poverty between the two groups of states in Figure 12 (0.32-0.21=0.11) is considerably 
lower  than  in  Figure  10  (0.42-0.21=0.21).    Holding  constant  the  distribution  of 
observable  characteristics  leaves  the  difference  in  cumulative  distributions  due  to 
differences  in  returns  to  observables.    Again,  the  apparent  higher  initial  incidence  of 
poverty  in  low-exposure  states  highlights  the  importance  of  controlling  for  initial 
conditions when comparing changes in income distributions. 
  The second graph in Figure 12 shows the cumulative density for wages in high-
exposure and low-exposure states in 2000, based on the characteristics of workers in 
high-exposure regions in 1990.  The fraction of workers earning less than the poverty 
wage is 0.40 in low-exposure states and 0.22 in high-exposure states, which again is a 
smaller difference (0.40-0.22=0.18) than that for the actual wage distributions in Figure 
10 (0.49-0.22=0.27).  Putting the 1990-to-2000 change in the incidence of wage poverty   24 
for low-exposure versus high-exposure states together yields a difference-in-difference 
estimate of (0.40-0.32)-(0.22-0.21)=0.07.  During Mexico’s globalization decade of the 
1990’s,  the  incidence  of  wage  poverty  in  low-exposure  states  appeared  to  increase 
relative to that in high-exposure states by approximately 7%. 
  To explore these distributional changes in more detail, Figure 13 shows estimates 
of equation (2) – the 1990-to-2000 change in income densities in high-exposure states – 
and  of  equation  (5)  –  the  1990-to-2000  change  in  income  densities  in  low-exposure 
states, where all densities are evaluated based on the distribution of observables in high-
exposure states in 1990 (as shown in equations (3) and (7)).  In low-exposure states, there 
was a pronounced shift in mass from the upper half of the distribution to the lower half of 
the distribution.  In high-exposure states, there was a modest shift in mass from the upper 
part of the distribution to the middle of the distribution.  While labor incomes in the 
1990’s deteriorated in both regions, caused in part by Mexico’s peso crisis in 1995, the 
deterioration was much less severe in states with high-exposure to globalization.   
The change in regional relative incomes is seen more clearly in Figure 14, which 
shows an estimate of equation (8), the change in income density in high-exposure states 
relative  to  the  change  in  income  density  in  low-exposure  states  (evaluated  for  the 
distribution of observable characteristics in high-exposure states in 1990).  It is clear that 
the income of high-exposure states has increased relative to the income of low-exposure 
states.  This appears as shift in mass in the double density difference from the lower half 
of the distribution to the upper half of the distribution.  During Mexico’s globalization 
decade, individuals born in states with high-exposure to  globalization appear to have 
done  much  better  than  individuals  born  in  states  with  low-exposure  to  globalization.    25 
  These results appear to be robust to changing the sample of states with either 
high-exposure or low-exposure to globalization.  In unreported results, I experimented 
with dropping high-exposure states one at a time from the sample and re-estimating the 
income densities and with dropping low-exposure states one at a time and re-estimating 
the densities.  Both sets of results are very similar to those reported. 
 
4.3  Additional Results 
Throughout  the  analysis,  we  have  evaluated  labor  income  densities  fixing  the 
distribution  of  observable  characteristics  to  be  those  in  states  with  high-exposure  to 
globalization in 1990.  This choice of the base case is arbitrary and should not affect the 
results.  To examine the robustness of the findings, Figure 15 re-estimates the double 
difference  in  income  densities  in  equation  (8),  evaluating  all  densities  based  on  the 
distribution of observables in low-exposure states in 1990.  Figure 15 is very similar to 
Figure 14, confirming that the choice of base case does not matter for the results. 
  The  income  densities  shown  so  far  are  for  average  hourly  labor  earnings.    If 
changes in wages affect individual labor supply, changes in hourly labor earnings may 
understate changes in total labor income.  To see if this might be the case, Figure 16 
estimates of the double density difference in equation (8), evaluated in terms of total 
labor income rather than average hourly labor income.  Figure 16 is similar to Figure 14, 
suggesting that regional changes in the distribution of total labor income mirror regional 
changes in the distribution of hourly labor income. 
  In the results so far, I have included the full sample of workers from low-exposure 
and  high-exposure  states  in  1990  and  2000.    One  concern  is  that  the  nature  of  self-
selection into work varies across states or across time.  If labor-force participation differs   26 
between low-exposure and high-exposure states, then cross-section comparisons in wage 
distributions may be contaminated by sample selection.  If these differences are stable 
over time, they may not pose a problem for comparing changes in wage distributions.  
However,  if  labor-force  participation  changes  differentially  over  time  between  low-
exposure  and  high-exposure  states,  then  sample  selection  may  also  contaminate  the 
difference-in-difference analysis.  For males with 9 or more years of education, labor-
force participation rates are very similar in low-exposure and high-exposure states.  For 
low-education males, labor-force participation rates are higher in high-exposure states 
and these differences appear to increase over time.  This suggests the data are missing 
more low-wage workers in low-exposure state than in high-exposure states, which would 
tend to compress the estimated difference in wage distributions for the two groups of 
states.  Further, since the relative fraction of missing low-wage workers in low-exposure 
states rises over time, my estimates would tend to understate the full extend of the change 
in relative wages between the two groups of states over time. 
To deal with sample selection associated with labor-force participation, I apply 
Lee’s  (2004)  technique  for  trimming  observations  to  make  them  comparable  across 
samples (which may vary by region, time, or some other dimension).  The idea is that if 
both wages and labor-force participation are monotonically increasing in the unobserved 
component of wages, then it is possible to make two samples comparable in terms of the 
distribution of unobservables by trimming low-wage observations in the group that has 
higher labor force participation.  We can’t add low-wage workers who don’t work into 
the sample in the low-labor-force participation group, but we can drop from the sample 
low-wage workers in the high-labor-force participation group (who presumably wouldn’t   27 
work if they were to be placed in the other group).  I trim low-wage workers from the 
high-labor-force participation group until I obtain two samples that are identical in terms 
of the fraction of wage earners included.  Figures 17 and 18 redo Figures 13 and 14 
applying Lee’s trimming procedure.  It remains the case that wages deteriorate by more 
in low-exposure states.  Income in high-exposure states increases relative to income in 
low-exposure states, which appears as shift in mass in the double density difference from 
the lower half of the distribution to the upper half of the distribution.  This is further 
evidence that during Mexico’s globalization decade individuals born in states with high-
exposure to globalization have done relatively well in terms of their labor earnings. 
 
4.4  Parametric Results 
  While the non-parametric results a strong increase in relative incomes in states 
with high exposure to globalization they give no sense of the statistical precision of these 
estimates.    As  a  check  on  the  statistical  significance  of  the  results,  Table  5  shows 
estimation results for equation (10).  The dependent variable is log average hourly labor 
earnings.  The regressors are dummy variables for educational attainment, a quadratic in 
age, a dummy variable for the year 2000 and its interaction with the age and education 
variables,  a  dummy  variable  for  having  been  born  in  a  state  with  high-exposure  to 
globalization and its interaction with the age and education variables, dummy variables 
for  the  state,  and  the  interaction  of  the  year  2000  and  high-exposure-to-globalization 
dummy variables.  This last variable captures the differential change in wage growth in 
high-exposure states relative to low-exposure states.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
correlation across observations within the same state.    28 
  Panel (a) of Table 5 shows that during the 1990’s the cohort of individuals born in 
states with high exposure to globalization enjoyed labor earnings growth that was 7.9 to 
9.2 log points higher than earnings growth for individuals born in low-exposure states.  
These coefficients are precisely  estimated.  This is consistent with the counterfactual 
density estimates and again suggests than individuals in high-exposure states enjoyed 
higher growth in labor income that individuals in low-exposure states.  The second two 
columns  of  Table  5  show  results  where  the  year200/high-exposure  interaction  is 
interacted  with  a  dummy  variable  for  an  individual  having  completed  a  secondary 
education.  This term allows relative earnings  growth to be larger for  more-educated 
workers.  The interaction term is negative, but imprecisely estimated. 
  Panel  (b)  of  Table  5  redoes  the  estimation,  trimming  observations  across  the 
samples to account for possible self-selection into work.  Estimated relative wage growth 
for high-exposure states is higher using this estimation method, with individuals born in 
high-exposure states enjoying labor earnings growth 9.0 to 10.9 log points higher than for 
individuals  born  in  low-exposure  states.    In  the  second  two  columns,  the  interaction 
between the year200/high-exposure interaction and the dummy variable for secondary 
education is negative, precisely estimated, and similar in absolute value to the main effect 
(the year 2000/high-exposure interaction).  This suggests that on average most of the 
relative wage growth for individuals born in high-exposure states went to individuals 
with low levels of schooling.  The income gains in moving from low-exposure to high-
exposure states appear to be largest for low-wage workers. 
   29 
5.  Conclusion 
  In this paper, I examine the change in the distribution of labor income across 
regions of Mexico during the country’s decade of globalization in the 1990’s.  I focus the 
analysis on men born in states with either high-exposure to globalization or in states with 
low-exposure to globalization, as measured by the share of foreign direct investment, 
imports, and export assembly in state GDP during the 1990’s.  Mexican states with high 
exposure to globalization are located along the U.S. border and in the relatively skill-
abundant center-west region of the country; states with low exposure to globalization are 
primarily located in more rural southern Mexico.  I exclude from the analysis individuals 
born in states with intermediate exposure to globalization. 
  Controlling  for  regional  differences  in  the  distribution  of  observable 
characteristics and for initial differences in regional incomes, the distribution of labor 
income in high-exposure states shifted to the right relative to the distribution of income in 
low-exposure states.  This change in regional relative incomes was the result of a shift in 
mass in the income distribution of low-exposure states from upper-middle income earners 
to  lower  income  earners.    Labor  income  in  low-exposure  states  fell  relative  to high-
exposure states by 8-12% and the incidence of wage poverty (the fraction of wage earners 
whose labor income would not sustain a family of four at above-poverty consumption 
levels) increased in low-exposure states relative to high-exposure states by 7%. 
  There are several possible interpretations of these results.  One is that trade and 
investment  liberalization  raised  incomes  in  states  with  high  exposure  to  the  global 
economy relative to states with low exposure to the global economy.  However, trade and 
investment reforms were by no means the only shocks to the Mexican economy during   30 
the 1990’s.  The Mexican peso crisis in 1995 was another important event.  The results 
are also consistent with states that were more integrated into the global markets being 
better  able  to  weather  the  large  devaluation  of  the  peso,  the  banking  crisis,  and  the 
contraction in economic activity that occurred in Mexico during the mid 1990’s.  High-
exposure  states  are  relatively  specialized  in  export  production  and  would  potentially 
benefit from a depreciation of the currency. 
  Other  policy  changes,  such  as  the  privatization  and  deregulation  of  Mexican 
industry or the reform of Mexico’s land-tenure system, may also have had differential 
regional impacts in Mexico.  Privatization and deregulation appeared to weaken Mexico’s 
unions and lower wage premiums enjoyed by workers in these sectors (Fairris, 2003).  
Since more heavily unionized industries are concentrated in Mexico’s north and center, 
and relatively absent in Mexico’s south (Chiquiar, 2003), we might expect a loss in union 
power to lower relatives incomes in states with higher exposure to globalization, contrary 
to what we observe in the data.  The reform of Mexico’s land-tenure system allowed 
individuals  to  sell  agricultural  land  previously  held  in  cooperative  ownership.    In 
principal we might expect this opportunity to raise relative incomes in rural southern 
Mexico, where agriculture accounts for a relatively high share of employment and output.  
Again, this is contrary to what we observe in the data. 
  Another possibility is that income growth in high-exposure states merely reflects 
continuing trends unrelated to globalization.  This also does not appear to be the case.  As 
seen in Figure 6, poorer states, which includes seven of the ten states with low-exposure 
to globalization, had faster growth in per capita income than richer states, which includes 
six of the seven high-exposure states.  The process of income convergence in Mexico   31 
came to a halt in 1985, coinciding with the onset of trade liberalization.  Since 1985, 
regional incomes have diverged in the country.  The pattern of income growth I uncover 
does not appear to have been evident in the early 1980s or before. 
A  brief  review  of  Mexico’s  other  policy  reforms  during  the  1990’s  does  not 
suggest any obvious reason why they should account for the observed increase in relative 
incomes in states with high-exposure to globalization.  Still, it is important to be cautious 
about ascribing shifts in regional relative incomes to specific policy changes.  In the end, 
we can only say that I find suggestive evidence that globalization has increased relative 
incomes in Mexican states that are more exposed to global markets.   32 
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Table 1:  Percent of Mexico’s Population with Per Capita Income below Threshold 
Needed to Achieve Minimum Caloric Intake 
 
             
  Area  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
 
Urban 
Households  10.2  7.2  20.1  16.4  9.8 
             
 
Rural 
Households  29.5  30  43.3  43.8  34.1 
  Source: Cortés, et.al (2003). 
 
 
Table  2:    Correlation  Matrix  for  Measures  of  Exposure  to  Globalization  Across 
Mexican States in the 1990’s 
 
         
  Maquiladora  Foreign Direct    Share of State 
  Value Added/  Investment/  Imports/  Population Migrating 
   State GDP  State GDP  State GDP  to US, 1995-2000 
         
Maquiladora         
Value Added/         
State GDP         
         
Foreign Direct  0.381       
Investment/         
State GDP         
         
Imports/  -0.008  0.582     
State GDP         
         
Share of State  -0.129  -0.371  -0.257   
Population Migrating         
to US, 1995-2000             
  
Notes:    Shares  of  state  GDP  (maquiladora  value  added,  foreign  direct  investment, 
imports) are averages over the period 1993-1999.  Correlations are weighted by state 
share of the national population (averaged over 1990 to 2000). 
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Table 3:  Categorizing Mexican States by Exposure to Globalization in the 1990’s 
           
    Average  Share of State GDP 
   State  Rank  FDI  Imports  Maquiladoras 
  Baja California  30  0.070  0.018  0.246 
High  Chihuahua  28  0.030  0.018  0.214 
Exposure  Nuevo Leon  28  0.039  0.027  0.023 
to  Sonora  27  0.015  0.034  0.088 
Globalization  Jalisco  25  0.018  0.027  0.029 
  Tamaulipas  25  0.035  0.013  0.181 
  Aguascalientes  25  0.015  0.014  0.046 
           
  DF  22  0.055  0.058  0.000 
  Coahuila  22  0.011  0.014  0.077 
  Yucatan  21  0.005  0.023  0.031 
  Puebla  19  0.009  0.015  0.015 
  Baja California Sur  19  0.032  0.011  0.008 
Intermediate  San Luis Potosi  18  0.028  0.011  0.013 
States  Guanajuato  18  0.009  0.014  0.008 
  Sinaloa  17  0.005  0.027  0.001 
  Tlaxcala  17  0.019  0.010  0.020 
  Queretaro  16  0.013  0.011  0.011 
  Durango  16  0.001  0.012  0.035 
  Tabasco  16  0.010  0.017  0.000 
  Morelos  15  0.024  0.010  0.005 
  Mexico  15  0.031  0.008  0.004 
  Michoacan  15  0.000  0.016  0.000 
           
  Zacatecas  15  0.003  0.013  0.008 
Low  Quintana Roo  12  0.006  0.011  0.000 
Exposure  Nayarit  10  0.006  0.011  0.000 
to  Colima  9  0.002  0.014  0.000 
Globalization  Guerrero  9  0.004  0.007  0.002 
  Veracruz  8  -0.004  0.012  0.000 
  Chiapas  6  0.000  0.011  0.000 
  Campeche  5  0.001  0.008  0.000 
  Hidalgo  4  0.000  0.007  0.000 
   Oaxaca  2  0.000  0.005  0.000 
 
Notes:    Shares  of  state  GDP  (foreign  direct  investment,  imports,  maquiladora  value 
added) are averages over the period 1993-1999.   37 
Table 4:  Summary Statistics 
 
               
      High Exposure to    Low Exposure to 
Year     Variable  Globalization     Globalization 
         Mean  St. Dev.     Mean  St. Dev. 
1990    Age  33.6  5.9    33.9  5.9 
  High Grade  0  0.055  0.229    0.132  0.338 
  of   1 to 5  0.185  0.388    0.285  0.452 
  Schooling  6 to 8  0.273  0.445    0.255  0.436 
  Completed  9 to 11  0.208  0.406    0.141  0.348 
    12 to 15  0.139  0.346    0.100  0.300 
    16+  0.140  0.347    0.087  0.282 
    Wage  2.590  2.610    1.781  2.073 
      N  13,771        19,352    
                       
2000    Age  43.0  5.7    43.2  5.8 
  High Grade  0  0.036  0.187    0.093  0.290 
  of   1 to 5  0.178  0.383    0.255  0.436 
  Schooling  6 to 8  0.259  0.438    0.259  0.438 
  Completed  9 to 11  0.207  0.405    0.157  0.364 
    12 to 15  0.142  0.349    0.109  0.312 
    16+  0.177  0.382    0.128  0.334 
    Wage  2.656  2.798    1.674  1.965 
      N  11,807        17,967    
 
Note:  Sample is men with positive labor earnings aged 25-55 in 1990 or 35-65 in 2000 
born in states with either high-exposure to globalization or low-exposure to globalization.  
Wages are average hourly levels in 2000 U.S. dollars.   38 
Table 5:  Regression Results 
              
    Workers w/    Workers w/ 
  All  20-80 Hour  All  20-80 Hour 
   Workers  Work Week  Workers  Work Week 
         
  (a) Full Sample of Workers   
         
Year 2000*High Exposure  0.092  0.079  0.115  0.116 
  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.053)  (0.050) 
         
Year 2000*High 
Exposure*      -0.050  -0.079 
Secondary Education      (0.042)  (0.046) 
         
R   0.337  0.373  0.337  0.373 
N  45,012  42,298  45,012  42,298 
              
         
  (b) Trimmed Sample to Account for Sample Selection 
         
Year 2000*High Exposure  0.109  0.090  0.159  0.153 
  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.040)  (0.039) 
         
Year 2000*High Exposure      -0.106  -0.130 
*Secondary Education      (0.031)  (0.034) 
         
R   0.380  0.417  0.380  0.418 
N  42,711  40,224  42,711  40,224 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is log average hourly labor earnings.  In columns 1 and 3, 
the sample is non-self-employed males born in states with high exposure to globalization 
or states with low exposure to globalization; in columns 2 and 4, the sample includes only 
the  non-self-employed  who  report  working  20-80  hours  a  week.    Other  regressors 
(quadratic in age, dummies for year of education, and their interactions with year 2000 
dummy  and  with  High  Exposure  dummy;  year  2000  dummy  variable;  state  dummy 
variables)  are  not  shown.    Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses  and  are  adjusted  for 
correlation across observations within birth states.  In panel (a), the sample is working 
males in all states and time periods; in panel (b), I trim low-wage workers in high-labor-
force-participation state/year groups until the fraction of wage-earners is the same in low-
exposure and high-exposure states and in the two years. 
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Figure 6:  Growth in Log GDP across Mexican States, 1970-2001 
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Figure 10:  Cumulative Distribution of Hourly Labor Income in States with  












-4 -2 0 2 4
lnw














-4 -2 0 2 4
lnw
High 2000 Low 2000  46 
Figure 11:  
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Figure 12: Counterfactual Cumulative Income Distributions,  
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Figure 17:   Estimated Change in Labor Income Densities, 1990 to 2000,  
with Observations Trimmed to Account for Selection into Work 
 
 
Figure 18:  Double Difference in Labor Income Densities,  
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